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Abstract 
 
Exchange rate stability was defined as one of the prerequisites for monetary 
integration in Europe. In this paper, we analyze recent developments in the volatility of 
exchange rates of the Central European countries (the Visegrad Group) and a selected group 
of European Union countries (the Snake) participating in the former European Monetary 
System. We compare volatilities in the currencies of both groups under specific exchange rate 
regimes using two different approaches to modeling exchange rate volatility: squared returns 
parametric model and GARCH. Both methods provide identical results for the currencies of 
the Visegrad group: an increase in volatility after a floating exchange rate regime was 
introduced. The case of the Snake countries exhibits mixed results for two currencies and a 
concurring result for the others: a decrease in volatility. In one case we are left with an 
insignificant coefficient. We consider the results as robust and suitable for policy making 
decisions. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
This paper analyzes the volatility of the exchange rates of the Central European countries and 
compares it to the volatility of exchange rates of the European Union countries participating 
in the former European Monetary System. Since exchange rate stability was defined as one of 
the prerequisites for monetary integration in Europe, the topic is important for prospective 
candidates from transition countries. Further, realized volatility under specific exchange rate 
regimes can be used to compare the prospects of candidate countries for exchange rate 
policies during the pre-accession period. 
A parallel in the development of exchange rate regimes in the European Union and 
advanced transition countries underlies the motivation to compare exchange rate volatility 
when an exchange rate regime becomes less tight due to a change in arrangement. The 
European Monetary System (EMS) was established in March 1979 as a way to stabilize 
exchange rate volatility within the countries of European Community (EC). According to the 
EMS, the EC countries agreed to limit fluctuations to their bilateral exchange rates in an 
obligatory way by interventions of national central banks that was known as the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM). From the beginning, all EC countries were members of the EMS 
but only eight of them initially participated in the ERM: Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, and Italy. Spain joined the ERM in 1989 
followed by the United Kingdom and Portugal in 1990 and 1992, respectively. Only Greece 
did not join the ERM. However, after a major exchange rate crisis in September 1992, the 
United Kingdom and Italy stopped participating. After another crisis in August 1993, the 
ERM was redefined to allow for wider fluctuation bands. 
The European Monetary System was created as a first step towards the full monetary 
integration of countries participating in this system (originally eleven countries). An essential 
feature of this system was that all countries adhering to the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) fixed their currencies to all other currencies and then their exchange rates could 
fluctuate in a range of ±2.25% from central parity.
1 The central banks of participating 
countries were obliged to keep their currencies within the defined band. However, after many 
attacks and high market pressures (1992–1993), some central banks had to re-align the value 
of central parity and finally all central banks broadened the fluctuation band to ±15%. Despite 
the fact that the exchange rate regime was formally still fixed, the width of the band (30% in 2 
absolute value) warrants consideration as a floating regime. Therefore we consider the first 
part of EMS history dating from March 1979 to 1993 as a period with a fixed exchange rate 
within a narrow band, and from 1993 to 1999 (the introduction of the Euro) as a period with a 
floating exchange rate. We hypothesize that the volatility of exchange rates of the EMS 
member countries during the period of a fixed regime should be different than volatility 
during the quasi-floating regime from 1993 until 1999. Volatility during the latter period 
could be used as a proxy to measure exchange rate stability during such a period. Thus, this 
could be used as a complementary measure of stability stipulated in one of the Maastricht 
criteria. 
In Central Europe the institutional design of exchange rate regimes has varied across 
countries since the beginning of transition. The degree of exchange rate regime homogeneity 
is not comparable to that of the former EMS but we can observe certain evolutionary 
similarities. The exchange rates of the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia were 
fixed from the beginning of the transition process. The Czech and Slovak republics fixed 
their currencies to a currency basket. Until January 1, 1993 both republics formed a 
federation and shared a uniform exchange rate policy. Thus, at the beginning of transition, 
this currency basket consisted of five different currencies, and later of the US dollar and 
German mark. The weights of each currency in the basket were based on the importance of a 
particular currency in the foreign trade of the country. The width of the band was set at 
±0.5% from central parity. After the separation in 1993 Slovakia changed the band to ±7% 
and later the Czech Republic changed it to ±7.5%. Central banks were obliged to intervene in 
the currency market to sustain the basket peg. A similar institutional evolution was 
encountered in Poland and Hungary. The only difference is that these two countries adopted a 
pre-announced crawling peg to the basket of currencies. The central parity was not constant, 
as in case of the Czech Republic or Slovakia, but was changed each month. The periodic 
devaluations were announced ahead of time. In some cases the width of the band was 
changed during the period as well. The intricacy of such institutional design is clear from 
Table 1 (for all tables see Appendix B), which displays in extensive detail all the adjustments 
that the central banks of the four CEE countries adopted in exchange rate management. The 
abundance of these adjustments is apparent in the cases of Poland and Hungary.
2 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 A wider band (±6%) was provided for Italy during the earlier stage of the system, as well as for Spain and 
Portugal. 
2 For additional details on regimes in transition countries see Tomczynska (1998). 3 
After the turmoil in financial markets, in May 1997 the Czech Republic was the first 
Central European country to adopt a floating exchange rate regime. In October 1998, the 
National Bank of Slovakia followed by adopting this regime as well. Later, Poland (in 2000) 
and Hungary (“quasi” in 2001) left the fixed regime and also adopted a floating regime. 
Therefore, we can see a general tendency of easing from a tight exchange regime to a looser 
exchange regime (Kočenda 2002). Further, the tendency to allow the markets to determine 
the price of the national currency has been same for both the EMS and Central European 
countries. The two groups are thus natural candidates for comparison from an exchange 
regime perspective. Nevertheless, there is another important motivation. All four Central 
European countries have received an invitation for European Union membership, and already 
declared a wish to be part of the economic and monetary union (or Euro zone) sooner or later. 
The membership alone does not mean immediate participation in the Euro zone. However, 
EU membership will increase pressure to maintain the institutional and economic 
environment and should even foster the Euro-conversion-oriented development of the 
exchange rates of Central European countries. A looser exchange regime with the Euro as a 
reference currency should be considered as a pursuit of a credible peg for a domestic 
currency with respect to the Euro that allows for necessary responses to the market. As a 
matter of fact, if a currency fluctuates within a ±15% band with respect to the Euro, then it 
implicitly follows the ERM II condition even if the country does not participate formally. 
Based on Krugman’s (1991) theoretical model, widening the fluctuation band should 
lead to an increase in the credibility of the band and consequently to lowering the volatility of 
the exchange rate. Sosvilla-Rivero, Fernandez-Rodriguez and Bajo-Rubio (1999) compare 
volatility in the six EMS exchange rates before and after the crisis in August 1993. They used 
an indicator of local volatility based on the inverse of the maximum Lyapunov characteristic 
exponent as a measure of volatility. They find that broadening the bands would have led, in 
the first stage, to a decrease in volatility to levels comparable with those prevailing before the 
crisis. However, the subsequent episode of instability occurring at the end of February and 
particularly at the beginning of March 1995 witnessed a renewed increase in exchange rate 
volatility for all currencies considered, the only exception being the Dutch gulden. Similarly, 
Ayso, Perez-Jurado and Restoy (1994) conclude that broadening of the band led to a decrease 
in volatility to levels comparable to those prevailing before the crisis. Ledesma-Rodrigues et 
al. (2003) claim that widening of the fluctuation bands caused an increase in credibility. The 
higher credibility should reduce the exchange rate sensitivity to a given change in 4 
fundamentals. An increase in credibility was found for the currencies participating in the 
ERM, with the exception of the Belgian franc and Irish pound. 
Carporale, Hassapis and Pittis (1995) explore how the widening of the EMS band has 
affected the behavior of excess returns on Deutsche mark denominated assets. Their approach 
consists of estimating simple forecasting models for interest differentials, and testing for the 
presence of significant (negative) mean prediction errors. The comparison between predicted 
and actual outcome indicates that the new system might be characterized by the virtual 
disappearance of ''weak'' currencies, as the widening of the bands has removed the 
expectations of realignments which resulted in high interest differentials. 
There is limited number of studies that examine the behavior of the exchange rate 
under fixed and floating regimes in Central European currencies. Halpern and Wyplosz 
(1997) document and interpret stylized facts of exchange rates in transition economies. 
Szapary and Jakab (1998) review the experience of Hungary with the pre-announced 
crawling band exchange rate system during 1995–97. Ivanicova and Rublikova (2002) 
analyze the development of the Slovak crown after the introduction of a floating exchange 
rate regime. Kočenda (1998) compared the volatility of the Czech crown exchange rate when 
pegged to a currency basket. He found that the volatility of the exchange rate decreased after 
a much wider fluctuation band was introduced to limit movements of the currency basket 
index. Brasili and Sitzia (2003) investigate the recent evolution of exchange rates for a panel 
of Central and Eastern European countries. Kočenda (2002) provides a broader look at the 
exchange rates and their regimes in Central Europe from the point of view of their 
convergence depending on different exchange regimes. 
A different perspective on EMS behavior is offered by Hallett and Anthony (1997). 
The authors compare the behavior of EMS currencies with that of non-EMS currencies. They 
find differences in the third and fourth moments for these two groups of countries which 
implies that EMS currencies have become more fragile and susceptible to shocks (particularly 
negative shocks) relative to non-EMS currencies. They warn that the bilateral variances 
within the EMS may have fallen, but variances against non-EMS countries appear to have 
risen so that some currencies have become less stable in effective terms. Another possibility 
is that the EMS had the effect of transferring volatility to another part of the system, and to 
the real sector in particular.  
Evidence of the impact of exchange rate volatility on macroeconomic variables is 
often mixed. Robertson and Symons (1992) argue that low exchange rate volatility brings 
greater output growth and lower inflation. Other studies, such as Sapir and Sekkat (1995) or 5 
Krugman (1989), do not notice the impact of volatility on trade, investment and growth. 
Flood and Rose (1995) conclude that the fixed exchange rates are less volatile than floating 
rates, but there is no clear tradeoff between reduced exchange rate volatility and 
macroeconomic stability. Papazoglou (1999) examines the contribution of exchange rate 
policy to output growth in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe. His 
analysis indicates that a fixed exchange rate regime during the transition process may serve 
the growth objective better since, to the extent that it is more effective in reducing inflation, it 
exerts a positive influence on output growth through the direct channel as well. 
Computing the degree of realized volatility is a usual way to assess the evolution and 
performance of an exchange rate system. We decided to adopt two different ways of 
computing volatility. The first approach lies in fitting the parametric model with a drift and 
diffusion function derived from the interest rate parity condition. Then, for the purpose of 
comparison we use estimates of the diffusion function. The second approach lies in fitting the 
type of GARCH process that allows for specific properties of exchange rates. Again, we use 
the estimates for the purpose of comparison. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the 
methodology used. Section 3 describes the data, while in Section 4 we present results. Brief 
comments conclude. Technical details are given in Appendix A. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The currency markets of Central Europe are usually not covered well in empirical finance 
literature. The research dealing with emerging markets concentrates mainly on the ''old'' 
emerging markets, e.g. Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, etc. and “new” emerging markets are 
largely neglected. The lack of studies thus offers few hints on specifications of the drift and 
diffusion functions and misspecification problems can be an important issue. For this reason 
other specifications that enable one to capture volatility should be used. 
Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Labys (2001) list three ways to approximate an 
otherwise unobservable volatility. A volatility which is inherently unobservable can be 
obtained by (a) fitting parametric econometric models such as generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH), (b) by calculating volatility implied by option 6 
prices, or c) by calculating direct indicators of volatility such as ex post squared or absolute 
returns.
3  
In our analysis we use (1) a parametric model where volatility is perceived as square 
returns of exchange rate after filtering out interest rate changes (residual volatility not caused 
by interest rate changes) and (2) by fitting a parametric GARCH-in-mean model for exchange 
rate changes. Since the option price data for Central European currencies are not available for 
the early stages of the transition process marked by under-developed financial markets we are 
unable to use the approach of calculating volatility implied by option prices. 
 
2.1. Squared returns specification 
The diffusion function, as a proxy for volatility, can be estimated using the most general 
parametric specification of Ait-Sahalia (1996) that was developed to model the behavior of 
interest rates. The general parametric model gives more precise estimates on smaller data 
samples. In general, continuous time models for interest rate typically rest on one or more 
stationary diffusion processes with dynamics represented by Itô stochastic differential 
equation: 
() () t t t t dW i dt i di σ µ + = , 
where it is the interest rate,  () t i µ  is the drift function,  ( ) t i σ  is the diffusion function, and 
{} 0 , ≥ t Wt  is a standard Brownian motion. Usually, functions for drift and diffusion are 
parameterized. Particular models differ in the shape of drift, but mainly differ in the shape of 
the diffusion function. The Ait-Sahalia (1996) model offers quite a rich parametric 
specification as follows: 
t
t t i
i i i
3 2
2 1 0 ) , (
α
α α α α µ + + + =  
3
2 1 0
2 ) , (
β β β β β σ t t i i i + + = . 
By imposing restrictions on parameters’ values such specification could encompass many 
earlier models. For example, restriction  0 3 2 1 3 2 = = = = = β β β α α  would yield the Vasicek 
                                                 
3 All of these approaches have some weaknesses and authors propose to use a new volatility measure, which 
they call “realized volatility”. They compute daily realized volatility by summing intraday squared returns. 
However, the weakness of this measure rests in the fact that it is limited to data with intraday frequency. 7 
(1977) model. On the other hand, the Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985) model can be obtained 
by imposing the restriction  1 3 = β .
4 
Ait-Sahalia (1996) argues that his specification proposed for interest rates can be 
extended to estimate mean and volatility of exchange rates. We believe that such an extension 
is not as straightforward as suggested. The model is specified so as to comply with the 
desired properties of level stationary time series (interest rate). The exchange rate is usually 
level non-stationary, but the first log-differences (or returns) are considered as stationary time 
series. Therefore, the properties of the model for exchange rate are very different from the 
model for interest rate and the Ait-Sahalia (1996) rich specification is not directly applicable. 
Thus, in the spirit of Ait-Sahalia’s rich specification we develop a model using the concept of 
interest rate parity as a background motivation (Keynes 1923). Our specification models the 
change in the exchange rate in the following form for drift and diffusion functions: 
() () t
t t t t
t t
i i i i
i i S ε α α α α µ +








− +








− + − = ∆
3 3 2 2
,
3 * 3
3
2 * 2
2
*
1     (1) 
() () t t t i i S η β β β σ + − + = ∆ ′
2 *
1 0
2 ,        ( 2 )  
where S is a log price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, i t is domestic 
interest rate, and it
* is foreign interest rate. The formal derivation of the model specification is 
given in Appendix A.  
The richly specified µ and σ
2 functions of the spot exchange rate have not been 
introduced previously in the related literature. Moreover, the empirical evidence so far 
suggests that misspecification of the models in the literature is caused jointly by the linearity 
of the drift and constant diffusion. These are the two main reasons why we opt for rich 
nonlinear parametric specification of the drift (mean) and diffusion (volatility) functions as 
above. 
The specification of drift uses higher order terms of Taylor expansion of interest rate 
parity condition. In the literature, it is normal to use only the first order approximation, but 
since we use countries with higher interest rates (sometimes 40% p.a.), the higher order terms 
are appropriate.
5 Further, we approximate volatility as a nonlinear function of interest rate 
                                                 
4 Recently Elerian, Chib and Shephard (2001) introduced a new methodology to estimate nonlinear stochastic 
differential equations when observations are discretely sampled. This methodology is able to increase the 
precision of estimates in cases where one is left with low number of observations. They compare estimates from 
their specification with that of Ait-Sahalia (1996) and find that their estimates perform well even in smaller data 
samples. 
5 It is possible to separate the interest rate differential into two variables—domestic and foreign interest rate. By 
separating them we would allow domestic and foreign interest rates to have different impacts on the exchange 8 
differential. This approach is similar to Bilson (1999). He argues that the volatility is related 
to the difference between the interest rates on the two currencies. The large interest rate 
differentials can only exist in the presence of high currency volatility, otherwise arbitrage 
opportunities would arise. Many empirical studies base their results on reporting standard 
deviation as a proxy for volatility (see Hallett and Anthony 1997, among others). We believe 
that such an approach is overly simplistic and that neglecting the role of interest rate can 
cause biased results. 
Interest rate parity as a background motivation for our specification is a concept 
challenged by empirical literature. In early papers, we can find a rejection of this hypothesis 
(Fama 1984 and Frankel and Froot 1987, among others). Baille and Bollerslev (2000) claim 
that failure to find evidence for the presence of the interest rate parity condition can be due to 
wrong statistical modeling. They run a simulation exercise using data generated under the 
validity of uncovered interest rate parity. The simulation leads to the results reported in the 
empirical literature, namely rejection of hypothesis. Later, more advanced econometric 
methodologies display evidence in favor of interest rate parity. Kirikos (2002) tests the 
uncovered parity hypothesis, based on the cross-equation restrictions on a Markov switching 
process. He finds that the parity relationship cannot be rejected for three European currencies 
vis-à-vis the US dollar. Bansal and Dahlquist (2000) list other factors that can influence the 
validity of uncovered interest rate parity (UIP). These factors can be per-capita GNP, average 
inflation rates, or inflation volatility. The recent Flood and Rose (2002) study shows that UIP 
works better on average in the 1990s than in previous periods. 
We advocate the use of UIP for the above model specification by the fact that under a 
currency basket-peg type of exchange rate regime the exchange rate is free to adjust to a 
smaller or larger extent. This feature is even more pronounced under a crawling or adjustable 
currency basket peg. This corresponds to the arrangements in both the Snake and Visegrad 
countries as we describe above. During the period when the ERM was in place serious 
pressures on exchange rates were followed by a depreciation in the form of devaluation or 
realignment. In the Visegrad countries exchange rates in Poland and Hungary depreciated by 
definition due to crawling or adjustable types of exchange rate regime. Exchange rates in 
                                                                                                                                                        
rate. This approach can be found in Svensson (1993) or Rose and Svensson (1994). In these studies the authors 
estimate the foreign interest rate to have a higher impact on exchange rate return than domestic. However, they 
did not conduct a statistical test for the equality of these two coefficients. The standard errors of coefficients are 
high enough to assume equality. We decide to use the differential, because the RHS variable (differential) 
should be integrated of the same order (zero order) as LHS variable (exchange rate return). We use this data 
transformation under the assumption that the change in domestic and foreign interest rate would have same 
impact on the exchange rate and only the level of interest rate differential plays an important role. 9 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic experienced pressure that built up over time and eventually 
depreciated after approaching the upper limit of the fluctuation band. Thus, evidence justifies 
connecting our specification with interest rate parity even for periods when exchange rates of 
both groups of countries were not fully floating. 
The estimation of the model is performed in two steps using the feasible generalized 
least squares, the same estimation procedure as in Ait-Sahalia (1996). First we estimate the 
discretized version of the drift equation (1) in the form: 
()( ) [] ()








− +








− + − = − + 3 3 2 2
| ln ln
3 * 3
3
2 * 2
2
*
1 1
t t t t
t t t t t
i i i i
i i S S S E α α α .   (3) 
The squared residuals 
2
1 + t ε  from this first-stage regression are then regressed by least 
squares, with a discretized version of the diffusion equation (2) in the form: 
[] ()
2 *
1 0
2
1 | t t t t i i S E − + = + β β ε .        ( 4 )  
The second-stage regression for the drift uses the fitted values from the diffusion regression 
to form the weighting matrix for the generalized least-squares estimation of discretized drift.
6 
In other words, we estimate the drift equation using variance-weighted least squares. This 
method differs from OLS in that homogeneity of variance is not assumed—the conditional 
variance of the dependent variable in the drift equation is estimated prior to the regression 
and varies by observation. Then, we treat this estimated variance as if it were the true 
variance when we compute standard errors in the drift equation. 
The method of generalized least-squares estimation assumes the following model: 
i i i x y ε β + = , 
where the errors  i ε  are independent normal random variables with the distribution 
() i i N σ ε , 0 ∝ . The independent variables  i x  are assumed to be known without error. Let 
n s s s ,..., , 2 1  be the assumed conditional standard deviation of  i y . Let  ( )
2 2
2
2
1 ,... , n s s s diag V =  
denote the estimate of the variance of y. Then the estimated regression coefficients are 
()y V X X V X b
1 1 1 − − − ′ ′ = . 
 
2.2. Leverage GARCH specification 
                                                 
6 For details see Kmenta (1990). 
 10 
The second approach for volatility modeling is the fitting of a specific parametric 
econometric model of the GARCH type. In the literature on the modeling of financial time 
series, and exchange rate especially, it is common to model the exchange rate changes as a 
GARCH(1,1) process. This rather simple specification is enough to capture the basic 
properties of financial time series. Naturally, there are many other, more sophisticated, 
versions of GARCH which are able to explain other non-normalities of certain time series. 
However, empirically, many series with a conditionally heteroscedastic disturbances have 
been found to be adequately modeled with GARCH(1,1) specification: 
()
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
0 , 0 ~ ;
− −
=
−
+ + =
+ + = ∑
t t t
t t t
k
i
i t i t N r a a r
βσ αε ω σ
σ ε ε
      ( 5 )  
where rt is the exchange rate change over two consecutive trading days, and k is the number 
of lags chosen by a certain lag selection criterion. Under the condition of stationarity, e.g. the 
roots of the characteristic equation lie outside the unit circle, the errors  t ε  have the expected 
value of zero and are independent over time. 
One of the areas addressed by many of the alternate specifications is asymmetry. 
GARCH specification implies a symmetric impact of innovations on volatility. Whether 
innovation εt-1
2 is positive or negative makes no difference on the expected variance in the 
ensuing period, only the size of the innovation matters— simply speaking it means that good 
news and bad news have the same effect. The theory of leverage effect, first described in 
Black (1976) on the stock market, suggests a different impact of positive and negative 
innovations. The large unanticipated drop in the market is expected to lead to higher volatility 
than a large unanticipated increase. Therefore, we augment GARCH specification by a 
leverage dummy, dt, to allow for innovation to have asymmetric effect on conditional 
volatility. It results in the following specification: 
  ()
2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
0 , 0 ~ ;
− − − −
=
−
+ + + =
+ + = ∑
t t t t t
t t t
k
i
i t i t
d
N r a a r
ε ξ βσ αε ω σ
σ ε ε
      ( 6 )  
where the dummy variable dt-1 is equal to 1 if εt-1<0 and 0 otherwise; rt is the exchange rate 
change over two consecutive trading days, and k is the number of the lags chosen by 
Schwarz-Bayesian lag selection criterion. The specification of volatility with leverage effect 
(represented by the dummy variable dt-1) was introduced by Glosten, Jagannathan, and 11 
Runkle (1993) and applied for example by Engle and Ng (1993) and Hamilton and Susmel 
(1994) on asset prices or by Kočenda (1998) on exchange rates.
 7 
A negative value of the coefficient ξ would imply that negative news (innovation) 
increases the subsequent volatility of the exchange rate more than positive news (innovation). 
The value of the statistically significant leverage coefficient ξ then indicates the magnitude of 
the leverage effect, and the sign its direction. A positive value of the coefficient ξ indicates an 
increase—and a negative coefficient a decrease—in subsequent volatility of the exchange 
rate. By comparing values and signs of statistically significant leverage coefficients for a 
particular exchange rate in the two separate periods of tighter and looser exchange rate 
regime, it is possible to comment on the effect of the exchange regime on volatility.
8 
The estimation of the model is performed by using a log-likelihood function of the 
form  ()  


 


+ − = ∑
=
T
t t t
t
t t L
0
2
2
2 2 ln
2
1
ln
σ
ε
πσ .
9 The maximum likelihood estimates were obtained by 
using a numerical optimization algorithm described by Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman 
(1974). 
 
3. Data 
 
For the purpose of comparative analysis we use two groups of countries with similar 
economic and institutional developments with respect to exchange rate regime. In the case of 
the EMS countries we use the group of countries that adopted a tight exchange rate regime 
even prior to the EMS. This group of countries, the so-called “Snake”, consists of Germany, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, and Denmark; it also included France on several occasions. In 
1973, these countries fixed their exchange rates with each other while jointly floating against 
other countries. In 1979 these countries were among the founders of the EMS and during its 
history never deviated from the ERM. For this reason we consider this group as a benchmark 
                                                 
7 The leverage effect was analyzed in stock price movements. For example, in the case of equities, Black (1976) 
and Nelson (1991), among others, argued that a stock price decrease tends to increase subsequent volatility more 
than would a stock price increase of the same magnitude. In the case of the exchange rate, the leverage effect 
represents the fact that a decrease in the price of a foreign currency in terms of domestic currency, or domestic 
currency’s appreciation, would tend to increase the subsequent volatility of the domestic currency more than 
would a depreciation of an equal magnitude. Despite the fact that holding a foreign exchange is similar, in terms 
of risk, to holding equities, the literature dealing with the “leverage effect” in the context of exchange rate 
fluctuation is still lacking. 
8 In an earlier version of this paper, we used a model with a variance in mean equation. However, the variable 
turned out to be insignificant, and therefore, we opt for the model without a variance in mean equation.  
9 Suggested in Bollerslev (1986). 12 
case.
10 In 1993 all countries widened their fluctuation band and from this year on we can 
consider their arrangement as a floating exchange rate system. 
Potentially, there is another factor that could influence the exchange rate volatility, 
namely the credibility of the ERM arrangement. As we already mentioned in the 
Introduction, Krugman (1991) justifies the existence of the link between the width of the 
fluctuation band and the credibility of the arrangement. He considers the causality running 
from the width of band to credibility. Unfortunately, the credibility could be influenced by 
other factors than width of fluctuation band, for example the interest rate differential, 
inflation rate differential, or the level of foreign reserves. That is why we choose countries 
(Snake) that have the highest credibility among the ERM countries and enjoyed this 
reputation over the whole time span. By including the countries that were forced to re-align 
the central parity many times we would face the problem of the inclusion of a credibility 
variable in our model. August 1993 is the indisputable date when the exchange rate 
fluctuation band was significantly increased and credibility probably as well. The change in 
credibility, however, was not so pronounced for the Snake countries as for the other ERM 
countries. According to Ledesma-Rodrigues et al. (2003) the biggest changes in credibility 
occurred during the 1980s and in 1993. Moreover, for Belgium and the Netherlands the 
change did not occur even in 1993. For other ERM countries, the width of the band brought 
an increase in credibility. It is important that there was no other substantial change in 
credibility that was caused by any other factor than broadening of the band. The careful 
choice of countries with similar credibility should diminish the effect of credibility on 
exchange rate in our analysis.  
As for the Central European countries we chose the Visegrad Four group that consists 
of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia. As early as December 1991, the 
former Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary signed the “European Agreements” with the 
European Union. These countries have striven to establish a workable framework for 
international trade and co-operation in order to facilitate the transition process. Their effort 
was institutionalized in March 1993 in the form of the Central European Free Trade 
Agreement (CEFTA) that was signed also by Slovenia.
11 
                                                 
10 Kočenda and Pappel (1997) find that countries which continuously participated in the narrow ERM band 
show a dramatically higher convergence rate of inflation during the ERM period than those staying outside the 
mechanism. They credit this fact to the disciplining effect of the ERM. For details see also Giavazzi and 
Giovanninni (1989). 
11 Kočenda (2001) examines the macroeconomic convergence of Central European countries. He finds that the 
group of five countries that signed the original CEFTA agreement (the Visegrad group is a subset of CEFTA 
countrywise) display similar and relatively high degrees of convergence in macroeconomic fundamentals. He 13 
We use nominal exchange rates expressed in terms of the Deutsche mark (or Euro) to 
calculate changes in exchange rate over two consecutive periods. We use interest rates of 
one-month maturity to calculate the needed interest rate differentials. In the literature we may 
also find shorter maturities used, however, one-month maturity is the maturity that is 
published in each country for the longest period. It is also a standard reference interest rate 
for most central banks. The basic statistics for exchange rate changes are in Table 1 and for 
interest rates in Table 2. 
The motivation for our comparison lies in a change from one exchange rate regime to 
another. The date of change from fixed to floating exchange rate regime is our anchor date. 
For Snake countries it is uniformly August 2, 1993. However, for Visegrad Four countries the 
day when countries changed their exchange rate regimes are different. The national banks 
introduced a floating regime on the following dates: May 26, 1997 in the Czech Republic, 
October 2, 1998 in Slovakia, and April 12, 2000 in Poland. In the case of Poland, we can 
consider a close parallel to the post-1993 development of the EMS. Poland introduced a wide 
fluctuation band of ± 15.0% (same as the EMS) on March 25, 1999. The same development 
is found in Hungary where the band was widened also to ± 15.0% on May 4, 2001 and no 
further monthly devaluations were implemented. 
Since the decisive point in time is the date of change from a fixed to floating regime, 
the time span for Snake countries begins on January 1, 1988 (5 years prior to the change) and 
lasts until December 31, 1998 (5 years after the change). As for the Visegrad countries we 
use the maximum length available prior and post to the change of regime, namely the data 
from January 1993 to July 2002. 
The institutional set-up goes beyond the exchange rate arrangement. It involves, 
among others, the degree of credibility, the independence of the monetary authority, the 
existence of targeting mechanisms (inflation, monetary aggregates), and, for the specific 
sample of CEFTA countries, the process of EU accession, and eventually ERM/Euro zone 
membership, with the same sort of expectation effects observed in the ERM/Euro zone 
changeover. The effects of these factors on exchange rates are covered in great detail in 
Vinhas de Souza (2002a). He finds that, for a sample of accession countries, a credible, 
independent central bank with a floating exchange rate and a targeting mechanism mimics the 
nominal variability (including exchange rate) properties of a truly fixed exchange rate 
                                                                                                                                                        
attributes this finding to two factors. First, international trade within the CEFTA framework serves as a natural 
means of coordinating economic development. Second, the prospective accession to the EU serves as an 
institutional means of coordination in order to satisfy a set of pre-accession criteria. 14 
regime. This result supports the hypothesis that the volatility of exchange rate is also affected 
by other institutional factors, not only the exchange rate regime.
12 But again as we mention 
above on the credibility issue, we choose those CEE countries that have very similar 
evolution of institutional setup over the last 10 years. It is not only a common change from 
fixed to floating exchange rate regime, but also similar (or same) quality of monetary 
authorities, transition experience, timing of EU accession process, EU entry, and finally the 
expected date of Euro area membership.  
The change of the exchange rate regime (or its important modification) represents a 
certain shock for the currency markets. Traders and central banks during the time before and 
shortly after the change react differently than during a “normal” period. During this period 
the exchange rate series have different statistical properties and contain many outliers—
observations that do not come from the usual data-generating process. Therefore, we decided 
not to include the month when the change occurred or one month after the change (or 
modification) of exchange rate regime in our dataset. Our results should not contain any bias 
coming from turbulent times. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
4.1 Squared returns  
As a first step we estimated the model for mean (1) where squared residuals from this 
regression represent volatility. Then we estimate equation (2). First we present results for the 
Visegrad Four currencies, separately for the periods of different exchange rate regimes. The 
results are in Table 3 Panel A. Then we present the results for the Snake currencies in Table 3 
Panel B. 
Because of the change in exchange rate regime, we expect the parameters of the drift 
and diffusion to be different during different regimes. Specifically, the particular 
parameterization is not time-homogenous. For example, the coefficient  1 α  of the process 
estimated during a floating regime should be different than that estimated during the fixed 
regime. Unfortunately, a lack of statistical significance precludes making an unambiguous 
conclusion with respect to both groups of currencies. The lack of significance is present for 
other coefficients of the mean function as well. 
The most important and illustrative part of the estimation are the values of the 
coefficients in the volatility function. Among them the coefficient β0 plays a pivotal role. This 
                                                 
12 We would like to thank Prof. Vinhas de Souza for pointing out this issue. 15 
coefficient captures the extent of volatility that does not depend on fluctuations in interest 
rate differential. The other coefficient (β1) portrays the volatility movements dependent on 
these fluctuations. The statistical significance of coefficient β0 allows us to make several 
interesting conclusions. Volatility during a “fixed” regime period is uniformly higher in 
Visegrad Four currencies than in Snake currencies. Volatility during a “floating” regime 
period is also uniformly higher in Visegrad Four currencies than in Snake currencies. 
When we compare changes in magnitude of volatility between periods of fixed and 
floating regimes the following findings emerge. The Snake currencies exhibit a decrease in 
volatility. As for the Visegrad Four currencies, all show a moderate increase in volatility. The 
result for the Hungarian forint is inconclusive due to lack of statistical significance during the 
fixed regime period. 
It is worth mentioning how the volatility depends on the (square of the) interest rate 
differential. For the Visegrad countries (except Poland) we find a positive significant relation 
regardless of the type of exchange rate regime. In the case of Snake countries, during the 
fixed exchange rate regime, the size of the interest rate differential is not significant, with the 
exception of the Danish koruna. After the introduction of a floating regime, the relationship is 
again significantly positive. Bilson (1999) finds similar results using the three world major 
exchange rates. 
 
4.2 Leverage GARCH 
We employ a maximum likelihood method in order to estimate the coefficients of equation 
(6). The results are in Table 4. Panel A captures Visegrad Four countries and Panel B Snake 
countries. 
For all Visegrad Four countries, with the exception of Hungary, we find support for 
the random walk hypothesis of exchange rate returns and predictability of volatility. This 
finding is in accord with established stylized facts in the literature. On the other hand, we 
detect significant autocorrelation in returns for Snake countries that refutes the hypothesis of 
random walk, while the predictability of volatility is again confirmed. 
When we compared the values and significance of the leverage effect coefficients we 
found the results for the Snake countries to be mixed. In the case of the Belgian and French 
frank we detect a decrease in volatility, while for the Danish crown we detect a slight 
increase in volatility and for the Netherlands gulden results are inconclusive due to lack of 
significance of coefficient.. Results for Visegrad Four countries uniformly show an increase 
in volatility during the floating regime period. 16 
In general, results from both methods lead to the conclusion that the width of the 
fluctuation band, either narrow or broad, does not necessarily mean an unambiguous 
influence on exchange rate fluctuation. There can be various factors that affect the volatility 
of exchange rate other than the type of exchange rate regime. However, the type of regime is 
most probably the strongest factor. In our analysis we try to isolate this effect and to assess its 
importance. The identification and evaluation of other factors is a topic for further research. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
We analyzed the volatility of the exchange rates of the Central European countries (Visegrad 
group) and a selected group of European Union countries (the Snake) participating in the 
former European Monetary System.  
Our methodology consisted of two different approaches. The parametric approach 
uses the theoretical assumption of UIP and the second approach uses a more traditional time 
series approach in the form of GARCH specification. Results from the first approach can be 
used for policy decision making, while the second focuses solely on the time series as such 
without any economic theory in the background. Both have strengths and weaknesses, which 
is why we opt for both. 
We compared volatilities in the currencies of both groups under specific exchange rate 
regimes. The currencies of the Snake countries exhibit lower volatility than currencies of the 
Visegrad countries under both fixed and floating regimes. After the change in exchange 
regime has taken place, volatility for the Visegrad Four currencies increased uniformly. The 
case of the Snake countries exhibits mixed results. The volatility of some currencies has 
decreased or increased. 
We base our conclusions on results produced by two different approaches to modeling 
exchange rate volatility. Both methods provide identical results for the currencies of the 
Visegrad Four group: an increase in volatility after the floating exchange rate regime was 
introduced. Both methods also provide identical results for half of the Snake currencies 
(decrease of volatility after floating was adopted) but leave some ambiguity since for two 
currencies the results are not consistent. Our robust findings can be used to compare the 
prospects of candidate countries (Visegrad Fourgroup) with respect to exchange rate policies 
during the pre-accession period and especially during the period prior to entering the EMU. 17 
Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
In this appendix we derive the mean and volatility specifications. We begin with the 
conventional notion of the interest rate parity in the form: 
() () i 1 i 1
S
F * + = + , where S is exchange rate at time t, F is the exchange rate at time t+1, i is 
the domestic interest rate, and i
* is the foreign interest rate. Taking the natural log of the 
above results in  ( )
()
* i 1
i 1
ln
S
F
ln
+
+
= , this can be further rewritten as 
()( )
* i 1 ln i 1 ln S ln F ln + − + = − . 
Taylor expansion of  () 1 1 ....
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to express the inter-period change in exchange rate as 
 
() ( )







+ + − − + + − =
4 *
3 * 2 *
* 4
3 2
i o
3
i
2
i
i i o
3
i
2
i
i S ln d . After rearranging the terms and 
neglecting the fourth and higher order terms we obtain the expression of inter-period change 
in exchange rate as a function of domestic and foreign interest rate: 
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* . This is our mean (drift) equation. 
 
For specification of volatility, we approximate volatility as a nonlinear function of 
interest rate differential. Hence, our specification of mean and volatility results in the 
following pair of equations: 
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Appendix B 
 
Table 1 
Exchange Rate Regimes Development 
 
 
A: Czech Republic 
Alterations of koruna exchange regime 
 
1 January 1991  Currency basket peg regime, Basket: 45.52% DEM, 31.34% USD, 
12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP, 6.55% CHF 
2  January  1992  Change in Basket composition: 36.15% DEM, 49.07% USD, 
8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF 
8 February 1993  Split of Czechoslovak currency – Czech koruna. No change in 
basket composition or band width 
3 May 1993  Basket 65% DEM, 35% USD, Band ±0.5% 
28 February 1996  Widening band to ±7.5% 
26 May 1997  Introduction of managed float with reference currency DEM and 
later EUR 
 
 
B: Poland 
Changes of zloty exchange regime 
 
1 January 1990  Exchange rate fixed to dollar. 1USD=9500 ZLP 
16 May 1991  Exchange rate fixed to a currency basket (45% USD, 35% DEM, 
10%GBP, 5% FRF, 5% CHF), devaluation to 1USD=11100ZLP 
(16.84%) 
14 October 1991  Crawling peg to the currency basket: crawling rate 1.8% monthly, 
NBP margin +/- 0.6% 
26 February 1992  Devaluation by 12% + maintain crawling peg 1.8% 
27 August 1993  Devaluation by 7.4% + Crawling rate 1.6% 
13 September 1994  Crawling peg 1.5 % monthly 
30 November 1994  Crawling peg 1.4% 
16 February 1995  Crawling peg 1.2 % 
6 March 1995  NBP margin +/- 2% 
16 May 1995  Introduction of crawling band +/-7%, crawling rate 1.2%, 
interbank rates subject to free market forces and NBP 
intervention 
22 December 1995  Revaluation by 6% 
8 January 1996  Crawling peg 1.0% 
26 February 1998  Crawling peg 0.8% and band +/- 10% 
17 July 1998  Crawling peg 0.65% 
10 September 1998  Crawling peg 0.5% 
28 October 1998  Band +/- 12.5% 
1 January 1999  Change in currency basket: euro 55%, dollar 45% 
25 March 1999  Crawling peg 0.3%, band +/- 15% 
7 June 1999  NBP is not obliged to perform transactions with commercial 19 
banks during fixing 
12 April 2000  Floating exchange rate 
 
 
C: Hungary 
Changes in basket and width of the forint intervention band 
26 February 1990  USD 42,6%, DEM 25,6%, ATS 10,4%, CHF 4,9 %, ITL 3,8%, 
FRF 3,5 %, GBP 2,9%, SEK 2,0%, NLG 1,7%, FIM 1,5%, BEC 
1,1% 
14 March 1991  USD 50,9%, DEM 23,1%, ATS 8,1%, CHF 3,9%, ITL 3,5%, FRF 
3,6%, GBP 2,7 %, SEK 1,5%, NLG 2,7% 
9 December 1991  USD 50% , ECU 50% 
1 July 1992  Band width ± 0.3% 
2 August 1993  USD 50% , DEM 50% 
16 May 1994  USD 30% , ECU 70% 
1 June 1994  Band width ± 0.5% 
5 August 1994  Band width ± 1.25% 
22 December 1994  Band width ± 2.25% 
1 January 1997  USD 30% , DEM 70% 
1 January 1999  USD 30% , EUR 70% 
1 January 2000  EUR 100% 
4 May 2001  Band width ± 15.00% 
 
Official devaluations of forint 
31 January 1990   1.0%    29 November 1994  1.0% 
6 February 1990   2.0%    3 January 1995   1.4% 
20 February 1990  2.0%    14 February 1995  2.0% 
7 January 1991   15.0%    13 March 1995   9.0% 
8 November 1991   5.8%    16 March 1995  1.9% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.060%) 
16 March 1992  1.9%    29 June 1995  1.3% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.042%) 
24 June 1992  1.6%    2 January 1996  1.2% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.040%) 
9 November 1992  1.9%    1 January 1997  1.2% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.040%) 
12 February 1993   1.9%    1 April 1997  1.1% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.036%) 
26 March 1993 2  .9%    15 August 1997  1.0% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.033%) 
7 June 1993   1.9%    1 January 1998  0.9% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.030%) 
9 July 1993  3.0%    15 June 1998   0.8% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.026%) 
29 September 1993   4.5%    1 October 1998  0.7% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.023%) 
3 January 1994   1.0%    1 January 1999   0.6% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.020%)  
16 February 1994   2.6%    1 July 1999  0.5% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.0163%) 
13 May 1994  1.0%    1 October 1999  0.4% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.0133%) 
10 June 1994   1.2%    1 April 2000  0.3% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.0098%) 
5 August 1994   8.0%    1 April 2001  0.2% (rate of daily devaluation: 
0.00654%) 
11 October 1994   1.1%    1 October 2001  No devaluation 
      4 June 2003  One time 2.25% devaluation of 
central parity 
 
 
D: Slovakia 
Alterations of koruna exchange regime 
 
1 January 1991  Currency basket peg regime, Basket: 45.52% DEM, 31.34% USD, 
12.35% ATS, 4.24% GBP, 6.55% CHF 
2 January 1992  Change in Basket composition: 36.15% DEM, 49.07% USD, 
8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF 
8 February 1993  Split of Czechoslovak currency – Slovak koruna, Basket: 36.16% 
DEM, 49.06% USD, 8.07% ATS, 2.92% FRF, 3.79% CHF, Band 
±1.5% 
10 July 1993  Devaluation 10% 
14 July 1994  Basket changed: 60% DEM, 40% USD  
1 January 1996  Band ±3% 
31 July 1996  Band ±5% 
1 January 1997  Band ±7% 
2 October 1998  Introduction of managed float 
1 January 1999  Reference currency EUR 
 
 Czech 
koruna
Slovak 
koruna
Polish 
zloty
Hungarian 
forint
Belgian 
frank
French 
frank
Netherland 
gulden
Danish 
koruna
No. of Obs. 1048 684 864 1136 763 766 640 610
Mean 1.15E-05 5.09E-06 7.97E-05 2.64E-04 8.67E-06 5.46E-06 -2.55E-05 -2.27E-06
Std. Deviation 0.0029 0.0034 0.0066 0.0024 0.0022 0.0013 0.0007 0.0020
Minimum -0.0130 -0.0384 -0.0412 -0.0143 -0.0304 -0.0160 -0.0047 -0.0164
Maximum 0.0207 0.0157 0.0463 0.0164 0.0253 0.0082 0.0035 0.0108
Start 05/01/1993 07/07/1995 12.08.1996 01/08/1996 02/07/1990 02/07/1990 02/01/1991 13.02.1991
End 29/04/1997 28.09.1998 30.03.2000 27.04.2001 29.07.1993 29.07.1993 29.07.1993 29.07.1993
Nom. of Observ. 1232 904 535 268 1298 1298 1298 1298
Mean -1.58E-04 6.36E-05 -7.94E-07 2.13E-05 -3.58E-05 -3.48E-05 1.63E-06 -4.79E-05
Std. Deviation 0.0046 0.0032 0.0084 0.0059 0.0011 0.0016 0.0004 0.0012
Minimum -0.0269 -0.0155 -0.0582 -0.0204 -0.0134 -0.0104 -0.0033 -0.0088
Maximum 0.0311 0.0248 0.0630 0.0439 0.0080 0.0087 0.0040 0.0093
Start 01/07/1997 01/12/1998 01/06/2000 02/07/2001 01/10/1993 01/10/1993 01/10/1993 01/10/1993
End 30.07.2002 30.07.2002 30.07.2002 30.07.2002 30.12.1998 30.12.1998 30.12.1998 30.12.1998
Czech 
koruna
Slovak 
koruna
Polish 
zloty
Hungarian 
forint
Belgian 
frank
French 
frank
Netherland 
gulden
Danish 
koruna
No. of Obs. 1048 684 864 1136 763 766 640 610
Mean 11.1% 14.9% 19.8% 16.7% 9.1% 10.0% 8.9% 11.8%
Std. Deviation 2.3% 6.2% 4.3% 4.1% 0.7% 1.2% 0.8% 4.3%
Minimum 6.2% 5.1% 13.3% 9.3% 6.9% 7.3% 6.6% 8.2%
Maximum 20.0% 42.5% 27.3% 23.9% 10.4% 18.0% 10.1% 35.0%
Start 05/01/1993 07/07/1995 12.08.1996 01/08/1996 02/07/1990 02/07/1990 02/01/1991 13.02.1991
End 29/04/1997 28.09.1998 30.03.2000 27.04.2001 29.07.1993 29.07.1993 29.07.1993 29.07.1993
Nom. of Observ. 1232 904 535 268 1298 1298 1298 1298
Mean 8.1% 10.0% 15.5% 9.8% 4.4% 4.7% 3.9% 5.0%
Std. Deviation 4.5% 3.4% 3.6% 1.1% 1.4% 1.5% 1.0% 1.4%
Minimum 3.1% 7.6% 8.8% 8.5% 3.1% 3.3% 2.7% 3.6%
Maximum 22.7% 30.0% 20.6% 11.6% 10.2% 9.0% 6.5% 9.8%
Start 01/07/1997 01/12/1998 01/06/2000 02/07/2001 01/10/1993 01/10/1993 01/10/1993 01/10/1993
End 30.07.2002 30.07.2002 30.07.2002 30.07.2002 30.12.1998 30.12.1998 30.12.1998 30.12.1998
Table 2
Basic Statistics: One-month interest rate on local currency
Fixed exchange rate regime
Floating exchange rate regime
Basic Statistics: Daily changes of local currency with respect to Deutsch mark
Table 1
Fixed exchange rate regime
Floating exchange rate regimeCurrency α1
  α2
  α3
  β0
  β1
  No. of 
Obs.
Czech koruna 0.010   0.087 -0.196 0.00079 1 0.3137 1 1048
(0.027)   (0.601) (3.094) (2.1E-4) (7.5E-2)  
Slovak koruna -0.058 1 -1.270 1 -6.069 1 0.00110 1 0.0708 1 438
(0.022)   (0.466) (2.114) (1.9E-4) (2.0E-2)  
Polish zloty 0.394   6.275 21.032 0.00345 10 0.1918 1 163
(0.330)   (5.232) (17.441) (2.0E-3) (6.7E-2)  
Hungarian forint -0.467   -7.054 -22.363 0.00425 0.1622   157
(0.417)   (6.113) (18.781) (4.6E-3) (1.4E-1)  
Czech koruna 0.003
  0.303
  2.662
  0.00395
1 0.3241
1 1232
(0.044)   (1.202) (6.928) (4.3E-4) (7.0E-2)  
Slovak koruna 0.008   0.195 1.197 0.00128 1 0.2381 1 903
(0.022)   (0.509) (2.437) (3.5E-4) (8.4E-2)  
Polish zloty 0.067   1.178 4.430 0.01992 1 -0.1671   533
(0.227)   (4.641) (20.758) (3.5E-3) (1.5E-1)  
Hungarian forint -0.305   -8.647 -55.905 0.00996 10 4.7748 1 265
(2.143)   (63.216) (430.394) (5.2E-3) (1.8E+0)  
Currency α1
  α2
  α3
  β0
  β1
  No. of 
Obs.
Belgian frank 0.473
  10.269 54.327 0.00070
10 19.7891
  763
(48.51)   (1142.43) (6689.20) (4.0E-4) (1.3E+1)  
French frank 0.147
  2.207 7.069 0.00040
1 0.2009
  766
(3.22)   (58.48) (260.19) (1.0E-4) (1.4E-1)  
Netherland gulden 0.020
  0.285 -0.710 0.00013
1 -0.7770
  640
(17.11)   (418.99) (2536.46) (1.8E-5) (5.6E-1)  
Danish koruna -0.036
  -0.669 -2.775 0.00070
1 0.0824
1 610
(0.53)   (6.58) (18.31) (1.2E-4) (2.7E-2)  
Belgian frank -0.029
 
-1.666
 
-24.943
 
0.00008
1
5.7048
1
1298
(1.71)   (66.06) (597.04) (2.1E-5) (1.5E+0)  
French frank -0.284
  -11.800 -117.824 0.0003
1 2.7850
1 1298
(2.27)   (90.43) (871.03) (3.9E-5) (4.0E-1)  
Netherland gulden -0.034
  -1.291 -11.570 0.00004
1 1.1479
5 1298
(1.71)   (79.97) (868.98) (4.5E-6) (5.2E-1)  
Danish koruna -0.144
  -6.170 -63.434 0.00011
1 2.2814
1 1298
(0.96)   (37.68) (352.46) (4.2E-5) (4.9E-1)  
Floating exchange rate regime
Fixed exchange rate regime
Floating exchange rate regime
PANEL B: SNAKE COUNTRIES
Fixed exchange rate regime
Table 3.
Regression results of the equation:
PANEL A: VISEGRAD COUNTRIES
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koruna
Slovak 
koruna Polish zloty
Hungarian 
forint
Czech 
koruna
Slovak 
koruna Polish zloty
Hungarian 
forint
a 0 0.00001
  0.00004
  0.00008
  0.00017
1 -0.00022
10 0.00001
  -0.00001
  -0.00008
(0.0001)   (0.0001)   (0.0002) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)   (0.0004) (0.0002)
a 1 -0.049 -0.211
(0.033) (0.104)
a 2 -0.029 -0.127
(0.031) (0.087)
a 3 -0.018 -0.009
(0.028) (0.076)
a 4 -0.030 -0.089 10
(0.034) (0.075)
a 5 0.015 -0.006
(0.034) (0.058)
ϖ 7.28E-8 5 8.10E-7 1 5.66E-6 1 4.07E-9 1 6.52E-7 1 4.95E-7 1 1.45E-5 1 6.40E-6 1
(3.1E-8)   (2.4E-7)   (6.7E-7) (1.1E-9) (8.0E-8) (9.4E-8)   (3.0E-6) (2.0E-6)
α 0.067 1 0.190 1 0.311 1 0.137 1 0.075 1 0.232 1 0.193 1 0.505 1
(0.012)   (0.028)   (0.041) (0.014) (0.012) (0.023)   (0.068) (0.105)
β 0.937 1 0.804 1 0.709 1 0.901 1 0.866 1 0.787 1 0.672 1 0.375 1
(0.011)   (0.039)   (0.032) (0.004) (0.013) (0.016)   (0.077) (0.107)
ξ -0.017 10 -0.148 1 -0.294 1 -0.064 1 0.076 1 -0.106 1 -0.226 1 0.238 1
(0.010)   (0.028)   (0.042) (0.019) (0.016) (0.026)   (0.080) (0.240)
Num. of 
obs 1048 684 864 1136 1232 904 535 268
Belgian 
frank
French 
frank
Netherland 
gulden
Danish 
koruna
Belgian 
frank
French 
frank
Netherland 
gulden
Danish 
koruna
a 0 0.00006
1 0.00014
  -0.00259
  0.01395
  0.00291
5 0.00321
  0.00190
  -0.00044
 
(0.0000)   (0.0096)   (0.0040) (0.0103) (0.0015) (0.0038)   (0.0017) (0.0033)
a 1 -0.906 1 -0.366 1 -0.238 1 -0.447 1 -0.210 1 -0.375 1 -0.210 1
(0.068)   (0.050) (0.048) (0.027) (0.025)   (0.029) (0.030)
a 2 -0.758 1 -0.191 1 -0.059 -0.239 1 -0.029   -0.128 1
(0.043)   (0.046) (0.045) (0.033) (0.031)   (0.031)
a 3 -0.396 1 -0.074 5 -0.146 1 -0.066 5
(0.040)   (0.032) (0.032)
a 4 -0.091 1
(0.029)
a 5
ϖ 1.47E-7 1 1.10E-2 1 2.51E-2 1 9.23E-3 1 3.03E-4 1 6.11E-5   1.02E-3 1 2.65E-4 1
(2.9E-8)   (1.6E-3)   (4.6E-3) (2.1E-3) (5.6E-5) (4.7E-5)   (1.4E-4) (8.5E-5)
α 1.747 1 0.223 1 0.147 10 0.353 1 0.186 1 0.100 1 0.123 1 0.164 1
(0.204)   (0.047)   (0.088) (0.049) (0.014) (0.011)   (0.026) (0.015)
β 0.304 1 0.673 1 -0.081 0.719 1 0.855 1 0.945 1 0.721 1 0.880 1
(0.026)   (0.031)   (0.182) (0.028) (0.010) (0.007)   (0.021) (0.011)
ξ 0.314 10 0.138 5 0.050 -0.112 5 -0.087 1 -0.088 1 0.186 1 -0.077 1
(0.200)   (0.058)   (0.095) (0.056) (0.020) (0.012)   (0.036) (0.016)
Num. of 
obs 763 766 640 610 1298 1298 1298 1298
Fixed exchange rate regime Floating exchange rate regime
Fixed exchange rate regime Floating exchange rate regime
PANEL B: SNAKE COUNTRIES
PANEL A: VISEGRAD COUNTRIES
Regression results of the following GARCH specification:
Table 4.
()
2
1 1
2
1
2
1
2
2
1
0 , 0 ~ ;
− − − −
=
−
+ + + =
+ + = ∑
t t t t t
t t t
k
i
i t i t
d
N r a a r
ε ξ βσ αε ω σ
σ ε εTimes series of exchange rates of Visegrad countries
 Figure 1
Average - DEM
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Poland
Hungary
Slovakia
Czech rep.
St.deviation- DEM
0.000
0.010
0.020
0.030
0.040
0.050
0.060
0.070
0.080
0.090
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Figure 2
Times series of exchange rates for Snake countries
Average - DEM
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Denmark
France
Belgium
Netherland
St. deviation - DEM
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.018
0.020
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
 
References 
 
Ait-Sahalia, Yacine, 1996, “Testing continuous-time models of the spot interest rate”, Review 
of Financial Studies 9, 385-426.  
Andersen, Torben G., Bollerslev, Tim, Diebold, Francis X., and Paul Labys, 2001, “The 
distribution of realized exchange rate volatility”, Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 96 (453):42-55, March 2001. 
Ayuso, J., Perez-Jurado, M. and F. Restoy, 1994, “Is exchange rate risk higher in the ERM 
after the widening of fluctuation bands?”, Documento de Trabajo 94149, Banco de 
Espana, Madrid. 
Baillie RT, and Tim Bollerslev, 2000, “The forward premium anomaly is not as bad as you 
think”, Journal of International Money and Finance 19: 471–478. 
Bansal R. and M. Dahlquist, 2000, “The forward premium puzzle: different tales from 
developed and emerging economies”, Journal of International Economics 51: (1) 
115-144, June 2000. 
Berndt, E. K., Hall, B. H., Hall, R. E. and J.A. Hausman, 1974, “Estimation of inference in 
nonlinear structural models”, Annals of Economic and Social Measurement 4: 653-
665. 
Bilson, John F.O., 1999, “The non-linear dynamics of exchange rates”, Working Paper, 
Stuart Graduate School of Business, Illinois Institute of Technology. 
Black, F., 1976, “Studies of stock market volatility changes”, 1976 Proceedings of the 
American Statistical Association, Business and Economic Statistics Section, 177-181. 
Bollerslev, Tim, 1986, "Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity", Journal 
of Econometrics 31: 307-327. 
Brasili A and B. Sitzia, 2003, “Risk related non linearities in exchange rates: Evidence from a 
panel of Central and Eastern European countries”, Open Economies Review 14: (2) 
135-155 April 2003. 
Caporale, G.M., Hassapis, Ch. and N. Pittis, N, 1995, “Excess returns in the EMS - do weak 
currencies still exist after the widening of the fluctuation bands?”, 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv-Review Of World Economics, 131 (2): 326-338. 
Cox, John C., Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr., and Stephen A. Ross, 1985, “A theory of the term 
structure of interest-rates”, Econometrica 53 (2), 385-407.  
Elerian, Ola, Siddhartha Chib, and Neil Shephard, 2001, “Likelihood inference for discretely 
observed nonlinear diffusions”, Econometrica 59 (4): 959-993, July 2001.   
Engle, R. F. and V. K. Ng, 1993, “Measuring and Testing the Impact of News on Volatility”, 
Journal of Finance 48(5), 1749-78. 
Fama E.F., 1984, “Forward and spot exchange-rates”, Journal of Monetary Economics 14: (3) 
319-338, November. 
Flood Rober P. and Andrew K. Rose, 2002, “Uncovered interest parity in crisis”, IMF staff 
papers 49: (2) 252-266. 
Flood Rober P. and Andrew K. Rose, 1995, “Fixing exchange rates: A virtual quest for 
fundamentals”, Journal of Monetary Economics 36:3-37. 
Frankel, J.A. and K.A. Froot, 1987, “Using survey data to test standard propositions 
regarding exchange rate expectations”, American Economic Review, 77 (1) 133-53, 
March. 
Glosten, L., Jagannathan, R., and D. Runkle, 1993, “Relationship between the expected value 
and the volatility of the nominal excess returns on stocks”, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis Staff Report # 157. 
Hallett, A.H. and M.L. Anthony, 1997, “Exchange rate behavior under the EMS regime: Was 
there any systematic change?”, Journal of International Money and Finance 16(4), 
August. 
Halpern L. and C. Wyplosz, 1997, “Equilibrium exchange rates in transition economies”, 
IMF Staff Papers 44 (4), 430-461. 
Hamilton, J. D., and R. Susmel, 1994, “Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity and 
Changes in Regime“, Journal of Econometrics 64, 307-333. 
Giavazzi, F. and A. Giovanninni, 1989, Limiting exchange rate flexibility, The MIT Press, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Ivanicova, Z.and E. Rublikova, 2002, “Quantification of the development of Slovak crown 
after transition to floating rate”, Ekonomicky Casopis, 50 (3), 359-372. 
Keynes, J.M., 1923, A Track on Monetary Reform, London, Macmillan; reprinted as Vol. IV 
of the Collected Writings of J.M. Keynes, London, Macmillan for the Royal 
Economic Society, 1971. 
Kirikos, Dimitris G., 2002, “Discrete policy interventions and rational forecast errors in 
foreign exchange markets: The uncovered interest parity hypothesis revisited”, 
International Journal of Finance and Economics, 7: 327–338. 
Kočenda, E., 2002, Exchange Rate Movements in European Transition Economies, In: 
Columbus, F. (ed.), European Economic and Political Issues V. Nova Science 
Publishers, New York.  
Kočenda, E., 2001, “Macroeconomic convergence in transition countries”, Journal of 
Comparative Economics 29:1-23. 
Kočenda, E., 1998, “Altered band and exchange rate volatility”, Economics of Transition, 6 
(1):171-181. 
Kočenda, E. and D. H. Papell, 1997, “Inflation convergence within the European Union: A 
panel data analysis”, International Journal of Finance and Economics, 2(3):189-198.  
Kmenta, Jan, Elements of Econometrics, Macmillan Publishing 2nd edition, 1990. 
Krugman P.R., 1991, “Target zones and exchange-rate dynamics”, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 106: (3) 669-682, August 1991. 
Krugman, P.R., 1989, “The case for stabilizing exchange rates”, Oxford Review of 
Economics, 106: 669-682. 
Ledesma-Rodriguez F., Navarro-Ibanez, M., Perez-Rodriguez, J. and S. Sosvilla-Rivero, 
2003, “Assessing the credibility of a target zone: A history of the EMS”, Mimeo, 
presented at 81st conference of Applied Econometric Association on “Exchange 
Rates”, Marseilles, France. 
Nelson, D., 1991, “Conditional heteroskedasticity in asset returns: A New Approach”, 
Econometrica 59, 347-370. 
Papazoglou, C, 1999, “Exchange rate policy and output growth: The experience of the 
transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe”, Post-Communist Economies 11 
(3), 319-336, September 1999. 
Robertson D. and J. Symons, 1992, “Output, inflation and the ERM”, Oxford Economic 
Papers-New Series 44: (3) 373-386, July 1992. 
Rose, A.K. and L.E.O. Svensson, 1994, “European exchange rate credibility before the fall”, 
European Economic Review, 38:1185-1216. 
Sapir A. and K. Sekkat, 1995, “Exchange-rate regimes and trade prices - Does the EMS 
matter”, Journal of International Economics 38: (1-2) 75-94, February 1995. 
Sosvilla-Rivero S., Fernandez-Rodriguez, Fernando, and Oscar Bajo-Rubio, 1999, “Exchange 
rate volatility in the EMS before and after the fall”, Applied Economics Letters, 
6:717-722. 
Svensson, L.E.O., 1993, “Assessing target zone credibility: Mean reversion and devaluation 
expectations in the ERM, 1979-1992”, European Economic Review, 37:763-802. 
Szapary G. and ZM. Jakab, 1998, “Exchange rate policy in transition economies: The case of 
Hungary”, Journal of Comparative Economics 26: (4), 691-717, December 1998.  
Tomczynska, M., 1998, “Exchange rate regimes in transition economies”, CASE Studies & 
Analyses Nr. 128. 
Vasicek, Oldrich A., 1977, “An equilibrium characterization of the term structure”, Journal 
of Financial Economics 5, 177-188. 
Vinhas de Souza, L., 2002, “Integrated monetary and exchange rate frameworks: Are there 
empirical differences?”, Working Paper Series, n° 2/2002, Bank of Estonia, Tallinn, 
Estonia. 
 
  
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 10/16/03 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 622: Exchange Rate Regimes and Volatility: Comparison of the 
Snake and Visegrad 
Juraj Valachy and Evžen 
Kočenda 
Oct. 2003 
No. 621: Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency?: The Case 
of Slovenian Manufacturing, 1994-2001 
Peter F. Orazem  and Milan 
Vodopivec 
Oct. 2003 
No. 620: Compensating Differentials in Emerging Labor and Housing 
Markets: Estimates of Quality of Life in Russian Cities 
Mark C. Berger, Glenn C. 
Blomquist and Klara Sabirianova 
Peter 
Oct. 2003 
No. 619: Are Foreign Banks Bad for Development Even If They Are 
Efficient? Evidence from the Indian Banking Sector 
Sumon Bhaumik and Jenifer 
Piesse 
Oct. 2003 
No. 618: The Echo of Job Displacement  Marcus Eliason and Donald 
Storrie 
Oct. 2003 
No. 617: Deposit Insurance During Accession EU Accession  Nikolay Nenovsky and Kalina 
Dimitrova 
Oct. 2003 
No. 616: Skill-Biased Transition: The Role of Markets, Institutions, and 
Technological Change 
Klara Sabirianova Peter  Oct. 2003 
No. 615: Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic 
Performance: Evidence from the American States 
Daniel Berkowitz and Karen Clay  Sept. 2003 
No. 614: Labor Market Dynamics and Wage Losses of Displaced  
Workers in France and the United States  
Arnaud Lefranc  Sept. 2003 
No. 613: Firm Size Distribution and EPL in Italy  Fabiano Schivardi and Roberto 
Torrini 
Sept. 2003 
No. 612: The Effect of Employee Involvment on Firm Performance: 
Evidence from an Econometric Case Study 
Derek C. Jones and Takao Kato  Sept. 2003 
No. 611: Working Inflow, Outflow, and Churning  Pekka Ilmakunnas and Mika 
Maliranta  
Sept. 2003 
No. 610: Signaling in The Labor Market: New Evidence On Layoffs, 
and Plant Closings 
Nuria Rodriguez-Planas  Sept. 2003 
No. 609: Job Flows and Establishment Characteristics: Variations 
Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas 
R. Jason Faberman  Sept. 2003 
No. 608: Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining: Evidence from China  Philip H. Brown  Sept. 2003 
No. 607: Policy Regime Change and Corporate Credit in Bulgaria: 
Asymmetric Supply and Demand Responses 
Rumen Dobrinsky and Nikola 
Markov 
Sept. 2003 
No. 606: Corporate Performance and Market Structure During 
Transition in Hungary 
László Halpern and Gábor Kõrösi  Aug. 2003 
No. 605: Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other 
Norms of Governance 
Amir N. Licht, Chanan 
Goldschmidt, and Shalom H. 
Schwartz 
Aug. 2003 
No. 604: Institutional Subversion: Evidence from Russian Regions  Irina Slinko, Evgeny Yakovlev, 
and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya 
Aug. 2003 
No. 603: The Effects of Privitzation and International Competitive 
Pressure on Firms’ Price-Cost Margins: Micro Evidence from Emerging 
Economics 
Jozef Konings, Patrick Van 
Cayseele and Frederic Warzynski 
Aug. 2003 
No. 602: The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections  Loren Brandt and Matthew 
Turner 
Aug. 2003 
No. 601: Banking Reform In Russia: A Window of Opportunity  Abdur Chowdhury  Aug. 2003 
No. 600: The Impact of Structural Reforms on Employment Growth and 
Labour Productivity: Evidence from Bulgaria and Romania 
Ralitza Dimova  Aug. 2003 
No. 599: Does Product Differentiation Explain The Increase in Exports 
of Transition Countries? 
Yener Kandogan  July 2003 
No. 598: Organizational Culture and Effectiveness: 
Can American Theory Be Applied in Russia? 
Carl F. Fey and Daniel R. 
Denison 
July 2003 
 